

Executive to the Director

23 October 1946

Chief, ICAPS

Status of Washington Document Center

1. The history of the proposed operation of the WDC by CIG can be summarized as follows:

a. In a letter signed by Admiral Inglis and General Chamberlin, a request was made that the DCI, "in accordance with par. 3c of the President's letter of 22 January 1946, perform for the benefit of all the intelligence agencies the processing, dissemination and housing of all captured Japanese documents ____". In a study that accompanies this letter there is included as a conclusion that: "____ the Washington Document Center contains the most complete and valuable collection of Japanese documents on the Far East available in one library in the world today", and the additional recommendation "That the Washington Document Center be transferred to the Central Intelligence Group as early as possible and prior to 1 December 1946".

b. A study was made of this facility by the CIG and the following action was taken:

(1) Budgetary arrangements were made by CIG to retain the civilian personnel on duty at WDC who otherwise would have been discharged on 19 October.

(2) General Chamberlin and Admiral Inglis were informed that CIG would be willing to take over the WDC if certain administrative arrangements for space and personnel could be satisfactorily resolved.

c. PBA has been notified of possibility of CIG taking over the WDC, and stated that if reallocation was required appropriate space would be provided.

d. A meeting of the appropriate representatives of CIG and of the agencies was held to consider the administrative problems. As a result of this meeting it was agreed that:

(1) Each agency would submit a memorandum to CIG stating the number of service personnel who would be allowed to remain in the Center.

(2) Representatives of CIG, in conjunction with the senior naval and military officer on duty at the WDC, would prepare a minimum table of organization showing the number of service personnel from each agency which it would be essential to retain to carry on the continual and effective operation of the Center until 1 July 1947.

(3) The agencies and their Departmental Secretaries would then be informed of the minimum additional service personnel which must be provided if the DCI could accept the proposal of Admiral Inglis and General Chamberlin.

Executive to the Director

-2-

28 October 1946

e. The minimum table of organization was prepared and disclosed that:

(1) 12 officers and 20 enlisted personnel should be retained from the War Department until 1 July 1947.

(2) 10 officers and 9 enlisted personnel should be retained from the Navy Department until 1 July 1947.

(3) Some 40 positions now held by military personnel should be converted to civilian positions by CIG, and some 15 now held by Naval personnel as shown.

f. Admiral Inglis informed the CIG that due to personnel cuts ONI was not allowed to retain any of this naval personnel on ONI rolls but recommended that CIG request an increase of 10 officers and 9 enlisted personnel from the Navy Department.

g. The Intelligence Division informed the CIG that it could make the following proposal which had been cleared with General Weeks, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff:

Weeks

- (1) All enlisted men to be retained at WDC until 1 January 1947
- (2) All officers to be retained at WDC until 1 February 1947
- (3) After 1 February 1947, 5 key officers would be retained at WDC.

h. We are now at the point where CIG must go to the top level in the War and Navy Departments to request the allocation of the required personnel, explaining how CIG cannot accept the proposal unless sufficient military and naval personnel are made available.

3. Discussion

a. This problem should be approached with the following points in mind:

(1) Intelligence Division and ONI have requested CIG to centralize Japanese document exploitation.

(2) Despite the fact that full cooperation appears to be lacking, such a request if acceded to by us, creates a precedent that intelligence operations and services of common concern should and can be centralized. This is especially applicable in that if CIG does not perform this function, it will disappear altogether.

(3) There can be no doubt that all foreign document exploitation should be centralized. Intelligence Division has already requested CIG to take over their own German Document Sections. It seems that if we are "to go into the business", the sooner the better.

CONFIDENTIAL

Executive to the Director

-3-

28 October 1946

(4) In this type of intelligence operation, it will eventually be preferable to use principally civilian personnel, and therefore in any event military and naval personnel except at the higher level should be dispensed with as soon as practicable. We can arrange for civilians formerly employed by the Army and for a few civilians from the Navy.

(5) The failure to accede to this request might give the agencies a basis for opposing the allocation to and centralization within CIO of various responsibilities which we feel are most important.

(6) Memos to the Secretaries of Navy and War respectively with a statement of our requirements should be sent out now with explanation that CIO cannot take over the Center without provision for the necessary military and naval personnel.

4. Recommendations:

It is recommended that the attached letters be dispatched by the DCI to the Secretaries of War and Navy, stating that the personnel indicated therein are those required for the period until 1 July 1947 for effective and continued operation of the WDC.

DONALD EDGAR

SE/EW:bhr